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My research investigates why nouns are learned
disproportionately more frequently than other kinds of
words during early language acquisition (Gentner, 1982;
Gleitman, et al., 2004). This question must be considered in
the context of cognitive development in general. Infants
have two major streams of environmental information to
make meaningful: perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual
information flows in from the senses and is processed into
symbolic representations by the primitive language of
thought (Fodor, 1975).  These symbolic representations are
then linked to linguistic input to enable language
comprehension and ultimately production. Yet, how exactly
does perceptual information become conceptualized?
Although this question is difficult, there has been progress.
One way that children might have an easier job is if they
have structures that simplify the data. Thus, if particular
sorts of perceptual information could be separated from the
mass of input, then it would be easier for children to refer to
those specific things when learning words (Spelke, 1990;
Pylyshyn, 2003).  It would be easier still, if linguistic input
was segmented in predictable ways (Gentner, 1982;
Gleitman, et al., 2004)
Unfortunately the frequency of patterns in lexical or
grammatical input cannot explain the cross-cultural and
cross-linguistic tendency to favor nouns over verbs and
predicates.  There are three examples of this failure: 1) a
wide variety of nouns are uttered less frequently than a
smaller number of verbs and yet are learnt far more easily
(Gentner, 1982); 2) word order and morphological
transparency offer no insight when you contrast the sentence
structures and word inflections of different languages
(Slobin, 1973) and 3) particular language teaching behaviors
(e.g. pointing at objects and repeating names for them) have
little impact on children's tendency to prefer concrete nouns
in their first fifty words (Newport, et al., 1977). Although
the linguistic solution appears problematic, there has been
increasing evidence that the early visual system does indeed
segment perceptual information in specific ways before the
conscious mind begins to intervene (Pylyshyn, 2003).
I argue that nouns are easier to learn because their referents
directly connect with innate features of the perceptual
faculty. This hypothesis stems from work done on visual
indexes by Zenon Pylyshyn (2001, 2003). Pylyshyn argues
that the early visual system (the architecture of the "vision
module") segments perceptual data into pre-conceptual
proto-objects called FINSTs. FINSTs typically correspond
to physical things such as Spelke objects (Spelke, 1990).
Hence, before conceptualization, visual objects are picked
out by the perceptual system demonstratively, like a finger
pointing indicating ‘this’ or ‘that’.  I suggest that this
primitive system of demonstration elaborates on Gareth
Evan's (1982) theory of nonconceptual content. Nouns are
learnt first because their referents attract demonstrative
visual indexes. This theory also explains why infants less
often name stationary objects such as plate or table, but do
name things that attract the focal attention of the early visual
system, i.e., small objects that move, such as ‘dog’ or ‘ball’.
This view leaves open the question how blind children learn
words for visible objects and why children learn category
nouns (e.g. 'dog'), rather than proper nouns (e.g. 'Fido') or
higher taxonomic distinctions (e.g. 'animal').
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